In the Netherlands, a changing of the whole guard

The Dutch coalition government collapsed last month after just two years in office, leading to early elections that will be held in November. Mark Rutte, the longest-serving Prime Minister in Dutch history and the second-most senior EU head of government, has announced he would retire from politics. Many other major parties, including Labour (PvdA), Christian Democrats (CDA), and the centre-left Democrats 66 (D66), have also seen their leaders bow out and be replaced.

Two years between elections seem like a very short spacing, but this is within the norm for the Netherlands. This will be the sixth Parliament since 1946 to last only one or two years; the average parliament over this period has lasted 3.4 years. But despite the short interval, this election will not look like the previous one at all. Indeed, it has the potential to completely reshape the political landscape.

A splintered politics

If Dutch politics is known for anything, it is for the proliferation of parties. There is no minimum threshold to win seats; any party with 1/150th of the vote can enter Parliament. This is fruitful terrain for political entrepreneurs looking to start something new, and increasingly they have been: 17 parties are currently in Parliament, a dramatic increase from the 9-10 parties that were represented through 2010.

This has made it increasingly difficult to assemble governing majorities: Rutte’s last two terms were the first where four parties were needed for a governing coalition. And even that has not been enough when considering the Senate: elections to the upper house in both 2019 and this past March saw surged for upstart populist parties, eventually reducing the four coalition parties to less than one-third of the chamber. The big question is which electorate shows up in November: the heavily splintered, incoherent electorate from this March (which will result in an unwieldy coalition or more likely a repeat election), or the more moderate electorate of 2021 that allowed Rutte’s coalition to continue.

A new normal?

Historically, Dutch politics was a 3.5-party system, with Christian Democrats, Labor, (classical) Liberals, and progressive liberals (D66) as the key players. Governments were mostly led by Christian Democrats and occasionally by Labour; they would feature exactly two of the “big three”, plus D66 where necessary for a majority (see table here).

Rutte broke this pattern by becoming the first Liberal to be appointed Prime Minister since 1918. His governments have been broadly unambitious and managerial, partnering with Christian Democrats and Labor in turn. Have the Liberals permanently usurped the role of the Christian Democrats? Or was it a one-off, where Rutte benefitted from a prolonged incumbency advantage that has now reset? It will be up to Dilan Yeşilgöz-Zegerius, the Turkish-born Minister of Justice and new Liberal leader, to prove Rutte’s success was not a fluke.

And what of Labour? There has been a drought of 22 years for progressive-led governments, which is long by historical standards; one might expect a “time for change” sentiment working in progressives’ favour. Labour’s 2012-17 partnership with Rutte was devastating to its reputation, and it has spent the ensuing years in the wilderness. But its has gained a fresh spark from its decision to contest the election jointly with the GreenLeft party, and its nomination of EU heavyweight Frans Timmermans as leader. For the first time in three elections, a progressive alternative has become an actual possibility.

Or no normal at all?

While the Left wallowed in obscurity and fragmentation, the most vibrant opposition to Rutte instead came in the form of brand-new parties of the Right striking populist tones. The far-right Party for Freedom (PVV) polled second for much of the last decade and even took first place during the 2015-17 migration panic, although its support has tended to melt away come election time. The upstart Forum for Democracy spiked in 2019 before collapsing spectacularly, its MPs fed up with their alt-right leader’s edgelord antics. And then there is the Farmer-Citizen Movement (BBB), which spiked earlier this year: it is not “far-right” strictly speaking, but it is clearly a party of backlash, particularly against environmentalism. Its support initially came from mainstream voters, then became turbocharged when far-right voters bandwagoned.

A polling average over Rutte’s years in power, including only notable parties. Each dot represents a monthly average (weekly average during campaigns). A local regression would likely be a better approach here.
A stacked graph of the same, with left at the bottom and right at the top.

And now a new wave is in the making, even as the BBB surge barely had time to abate: former CDA parliamentarian Pieter Omtzigt has announced a new party, called the New Social Contract (NSC). Due to his role in exposing the child welfare scandal that collapsed Rutte’s previous government (visibly causing Rutte a headache) and his criticisms of his governance style, he has come to be seen as something like Rutte’s foil. He left CDA after its inner circle froze him out of its leadership, sitting as an independent for a while before setting up NSC last week. The three polls since its formation have put it in first place, even as its stances on issues like healthcare and education are still unclear.

Pieter Omtzigt

The prospect that an independent figure can overturn the entire political landscape suggests that maybe the very concept of a “party system” is passé. Maybe the Netherlands will have a constantly shifting constellation of parties old and new, of which two or three gain traction at any given time. This is how politics works in several of the newer democracies of Eastern Europe, such as Slovenia, Slovakia, and Latvia.

This would be a shame, reducing parties to little more than brands with a leader’s face that don’t last long enough to build up much of a record or organization. And this prospect is the primary reason it’s worth spilling so much ink about Dutch party politics: many democracies have also seen parties “hollowing out”, losing ground to fleeting personality-driven outfits. Yes, the Dutch case is particularly extreme, and this may merely be a product of local factors. But perhaps they are simply further ahead on a road the rest of us are also traveling down.

The decline of the historic major parties.

There is no shortage of narratives to follow in the coming two months. Will Omtzigt’s appeal prove durable, and does his phenomenon sap strength from BBB or the far-right? Are historic parties like CDA and D66 really headed for historic defeats, or are their longer records and superior organizations good for something? Will even more microparties gain traction, or will an exciting race for first place focus voters’ attention? Will the centre-left finally come in from the cold, or are they consigned to another decade in the wilderness? And, of course: will voters be called back to the polls to do this again in a year or two?

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